A Substitute for War

Basketball philosophy

Did the Golden State Warriors put themselves in a box of impatience?

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In 2012-2013, the Warriors reinvigorated their franchise with a 47 win season and upsetting Denver to make it to the 2nd round. With a young superstar in Stephen Curry, the Warriors became a team of the future.

What makes cases like this usually so fascinating, is how the team reacts to the pressure of these expectations. The next steps can be the difference between making the Finals one day and never making it past the 2nd round. The Warriors looked at their cards and saw a great hand, but how would they take advantage of it when the flop came?

Going against the Warriors last summer was Carl Landry and Jarrett Jack becoming free agents, both 6th man of the year caliber players in 2012-2013. With an incentive to stay under the luxury tax, the Warriors looked set to let both players go, which may have costed them a playoff spot the next year.

Then they made their big moves. First they used 2 future 1st round picks and 3 2nds to sign and trade the expiring contracts of Richard Jefferson, Andris Biedrins and Brandon Rush for Andre Iguodala at 4 years, 48 million. Iguodala would be a perfect impact small forward to make up for losing Jack and Landry. I was critical of the Iguodala move at the time however. The Warriors also signed Andrew Bogut to a 3 year, 36 million extension. Bogut and Iguodala will combine for 25.3 million salary in 2014-2015, salary uncommitted by the end of the season last year.

Thanks to Bogut’s health, the Warriors are headed for their first 50 W+ season in 20 years, but will be a 6th seed at best and underdog in the 1st round. Their starting lineup was clearly upgraded this year, but the bench never recovered from losing Jack and Landry.

Between these two moves, the Warriors made a huge commitment to veterans. 3 of the Warriors starters in Andrew Bogut, David Lee and Andre Iguodala are from the 2004 or 2005 draft, putting them in their last few prime years before declining as most do once they become 10 to 12 year vets. To improve the team, they won’t have capspace for several seasons, nor a 1st round pick in 2014 or 2017 to either draft a young player or trade. Their best trade assets may be Harrison Barnes and Draymond Green, talented but not untouchable pieces.

In other words, the Warriors more or less went all in on the Lee, Bogut and Iguodala “era”. Their plan presumably is to ride this core until Lee, Bogut and Iguodala’s contracts expire in 2016, 2017 and 2017, then use the opened capspace to put a new team around Curry and Thompson.

But this doesn’t mean the move lacks opportunity cost. If not making the Bogut and Iguodala commitment, they could’ve spent 2014, 2015 and 2016’s capspace building their youth core. For example they could’ve made an offer sheet to younger players such as Gordon Hayward, Greg Monroe, Isaiah Thomas, or they could’ve used their capspace to do precisely what Utah did in their trade with the Warriors, take on unwanted contracts but getting draft picks in return. This is in addition to keeping the draft picks they gave to Utah, including a 2014 1st that presumably would have been a lottery pick without the Iguodala trade.

In other words, by committing to Bogut and Iguodala, they used up assets that could’ve been put towards younger, more long-withstanding team. Asset allocation is essential in the NBA. Using assets to make the 2014 and 2015 Warriors better could leave the team with less assets to make the 2018 and 2019 Warriors as great as possible. If the age of Curry and Thompson made contending 4-5 years from now more likely than this season, this could be a costly mistake. Assets are a scarce resource, when teams give them up, they’ll never get them back.

My feeling is the Warriors were too impatient. There was nothing wrong with finishing 9th in the West this year, then using 25 million capspace and a lottery pick to truly set the groundwork for a future Warriors champion. Instead they used crucial assets to make the 2013-2014 Warriors as great a team as they possibly could. And even that unfortunately may not get them out of the 1st round, if a series against the Clippers, Thunder or Spurs goes to the favorites. A “short term” all-in mindset fits a franchise like the Dallas Mavericks desperate to win before Dirk declines, but when your star is Stephen Curry who’s prime 7th to 10th seasons are still years away, I don’t like the approach the Warriors took. I’m not sure the Warriors have a great long term plan to raise a championship banner.

Written by julienrodger

April 14, 2014 at 1:51 pm

Posted in Basketball

Revisiting Gorgui Dieng and Jeff Withey’s talent level

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The 2013 draft class has started so slow, making literally any judgments about players careers may be misguided. Nobody has proven they’re good yet, nobody playing bad has to stay that way.

However two of the most successful picks on the board so far, are Minnesota taking Gorgui Dieng 21st and New Orleans taking Jeff Withey 39th. Both centers are over 15 PER, albeit in under 800 minutes. Dieng has gotten more buzz such as in this ESPN article, but in a redraft it appears both players would go much higher.

With my draft talent grading system I rated Withey and Dieng the 8th and 9th most talented prospects respectively in the 2013 draft, though I don’t mean that to brag. It’s still 3 or 4 years until my big board as a whole and system, should be judged. A critic could say even a broken draft system could be a blind squirrel finding a few nuts and point to the other prospects who haven’t performed yet.

But I wanted to use their play as an example to revisit why I liked their talent level more than most.

First, consider the main reason they dropped in the draft, despite Louisville and Kansas’ great success in college putting them on the map: Age. Both were 23 when drafted, now  24. Draft models that start with statistical production in the NCAA, rely on adjusting for age. In other words, players with a physical and experiential advantage over opponents may dominate them because of it, rather than more talent. Therefore their strong play in college was doubted.

In my system either age or net college production is irrelevant. I only rate them by talent level, which doesn’t diminish with age. When judging the clock for players to reach their talent level, I care about minutes played in the NBA, rather than age (by the time an NBA player reaches say, 6,000-7,000 minutes, it’s time to start showing their talent). Right now I am under the assumption that if a player has untapped talent level, he can always grow into it, even if he’s been a slow starter. In a few years if predictions for older prospects go the wrong direction, I may start to consider an “older prospects who aren’t producing are less likely to reach their talent level” adjustment, but right now I don’t see the evidence for this to be the case. Certainly if Dieng and Withey had great careers, it would help prove it’s right to not overreact to age.

So how about their talent level? First, here are two clips showing Dieng and Withey in impressive games so far in the NBA:

What most draft sites like ESPN/Draftexpress and I agreed on most with these players, is their basketball IQ/instincts. Withey and Dieng were players everyone knew were smart, because of they were top defensive anchors in the NCAA, intelligently rotating on help defense. Dieng was also a great passer, often associated with instincts.

In my system to help identify instincts in young players who may play “dumb” for experience or maturity reasons, I use the player’s fluidity and “naturalism aesthetic” to judge their feel for the game. Dieng and Withey also check out well with this test. Players like :31 and 1:02 in Dieng’s video and :28 in Withey’s help show those. Other resources like Draftexpress.com’s excellent prospect videos, help show they are fluid and natural moving prospects.

Many players get drafted for their physical tools however. In this area Dieng and Withey have strengths and weaknesses.

Dieng’s weakness is his explosiveness/burst is average at best. He is hardly blowing by defenders or rising up for dunks offensively. However I consider explosiveness a portion of physical talents, in combination with lateral mobility, height and strength. In the latter 3 categories Dieng does very well. His lateral mobility was one reason for defensive excellence in college, while he’s both one of the strongest and longest bigs in the class. This combination of strength, length and mobility is likely a major reason he’s excelled at rebounding in Minnesota to end this season. Overall, Dieng has more strengths than weakness as a physical talent. Especially considering a case can be made, for defensive responsibility reasons, C is the position where having lateral mobility, strength and length is crucial compared to offensive explosiveness.

Withey’s physical make-up is a little different than Dieng’s. Like Dieng, he has great lateral mobility which played a part in his shotblocking/defensive success in college. He’s more explosive on the offensive end, showing the ability to play about the rim, which is visible in the above clip. However, he’s quite not as long, as Dieng has a 7‘3.5 wingspan and 9‘3.5 standing reach to Withey’s 7’2 wingspan and 9‘2.5 standing reach, despite Withey standing 7.0’5 in shoes to Dieng’s 6’10.75. The main weakness Withey has however is strength, with a thin frame and one less likely to grow as an older prospect. At the draft combine Withey measured at 222 pounds to Dieng’s 230 pounds, despite Withey standing 7.0’5 in shoes to Dieng’s 6‘10.75. But on the whole, Withey’s offensive athleticism, lateral mobility and length, give him a lot to work with physically, with strength only a smaller portion of the net.

As for what these physical differences mean, it means Dieng is likely to be a better post defending and rebounding talent, while Withey’s explosive burst and agility may allow him to do a few things Dieng can’t offensively.

Finally, the category my system likely drew a result most different from the NBA’s evaluation, is skill level. Once again, the fact that the NBA and likely everyone else cares about NCAA production and my system doesn’t, is the major reason why. Neither Dieng and Withey were top scorers in college, Dieng averaged 9.8 points in 31.1 minutes per game as a junior, Withey 13.7 points in 30.9 minutes as a senior. Dieng’s scoring was considered poor for a 23 year old with physical advantages, Withey’s fine but unspectacular. Because of this, they were widely rated as defensive role players at the next level who would be held back by lack of offensive usefulness. Think Bismack Biyombo and Joel Pryzbilla’s roles in the NBA.

Yet the clips showed me more offensively skilled prospects than this. First, consider that C is by far the least skilled of the 5 positions. Some time after creating my system, I realized that merely the skill to catch/finish plays at the rim very, very well, even if the C didn’t score outside of the rim, was closer to average skill level at the position than poor. From my vantage point, Tyson Chandler and Andre Drummond represent the middle in skill level for Cs, while it’s the Jan Vesely, Kendrick Perkins, Joel Anthony types who represent the bottom. The former have a valued supporting role offensively, the latter players can barely be passed to without disaster happening either catching or finishing.

Although Jeff Withey barely took shots outside of the paint in college, he scored at the rim exceptionally well. More of a Chandler than Vesely, in other words. Further supporting his case was a 71.4% FT stroke, normally indicative of bigs with midrange shooting potential. Because of this I rated his skill level average at the time, but if he develops his shooting, that may prove conservative.

Dieng’s skill level was even easier to spot. Although his touch at the rim wasn’t as impressive as Withey’s, he regularly took jumpshots out to 20 feet, something also visible in clips like the above. In addition he had some skills in the post and was a terrific passer for a C. His 65.2% FT stroke was respectable.

So far this year, 38 of Dieng’s 196 FGA (19.4%) this year have been 10 feet and out jumpshots, hitting 18 (47.3%) of those shots. 12 of 117 (10.3%) of Withey’s FGAs are 10 feet and out, but he’s hit 9 of those 12 shots for a 75% conversion.

Both players project to be useful offensively. Dieng appears to already have a jumpshot, some finishing ability and passing skill. Withey has great finishing skill and the makings of a jumper. At C that’s enough for average to above average skill level. Considering their feel for the game and physical tools both provide things to like, a genuine skill game would complete them as prospects.

To me both Dieng and Withey look like clear starting C talents. At best they could be both defensive anchors with more usefulness offensively than the standard C. Considering the difficulty of finding productive two way Cs, this would be a valuable commodity many teams passed on. I consider it more likely I look at my rating of them 8th and 9th and think “that was too low” in a few years, than regret putting them too high. But they have more to prove.

 

Written by julienrodger

April 13, 2014 at 7:53 pm

Posted in Uncategorized

Some thoughts on Al Jefferson and the Bobcats defense-driven improvement

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After finishing with one of the two worst records in the league last year, the Bobcats spent big on Al Jefferson (paying him 15 million a year) and are now cruising to a playoff spot on the back of his career best season.

However if the NBA was played on paper, there’d be reason to doubt Big Al is responsible for this impact. In 2012-2013 the Bobcats finished 28th in offense (ORTG) and 30th in defense (DRTG), in 2013-2014 they are 24th in offense and 8th in defense. Big Al is known as an offense-first player who’s a defensively liability at C. Furthermore while Jefferson is averaging 21.5ppg it’s on .529 TS, one of the big movement in analytics is to claim high volume, below average efficiency players, are overrated. So an analytics-first person may say Jefferson has not improved the Bobcats offense much because of his inefficiency, while the team’s leap forward is on defense where he’s not contributing outside of rebounding.

But a case can be made Al has an in-direct impact on the team’s defense. I’ve been of the opinion for a while, defense is connected to energy. Not every team can play as hard as they can at all times on defense. If they due it may lead to a woeful offense, such as most Larry Brown and Scott Skiles teams. A team like this year’s Pacers may be one who is playing so hard defensively it may cost them on the offensive end.

The argument for why Al helps the Bobcats may start with this concept. By the offense leaning so hard on Al Jefferson, the Bobcats may have more energy to put on defense, both mentally and physically. Players like Kemba Walker, Michael Kidd-Gilchrist, Gerald Henderson, Josh McRoberts, Chris Douglas-Roberts, Bismack Biyombo may have a greater defensive focus because Al is on the team.

That’s in addition to tangible ways for a team to build more defensively now that they have Al. Last year Ben Gordon and Byron Mullens, two of the worst defenders and lowest impact players in the league, may have been playing because the coach thought “someone has to take shots”, pushing him to give minutes to shot jackers who are efficiency and defensive sieves. Big Al filled that volume hole on his own, allowing them to play more defensively competent and efficient role players.

The Bobcats are 1st in defensive rebounding % in the league this year (after finishing 29th last year) but are only 27th in offensive rebounding % which is probably a sign of coaching strategy. The Bobcats may not be going for offensive rebounds because they want to guard in transition more, or they may just be exerting more energy on the defensive glass than the offensive glass. When the Bobcats were 18th in offensive rebounding and 29th in defensive rebounding last year, they may have been likewise strategically targeting offensive rebounds more.

All in all, I’m of the opinion that talent often finds a way to win to their talent level, if they are well coached and play together. The Bobcats paid the money to improve their talent level this summer and reaped the benefits, in one way or another. They have a team who’s very good at defense and with enough offensive liabilities that the team may fall apart on that end without Kemba Walker and Al Jefferson using so many possessions at an OK level. That tells me Walker and Jefferson are important to their success. Every team still has to score enough to win.

Of course none of this is a guarantee. It’s possible the immediate picture the stats provide are right and the Bobcats improvement comes from coaching, an improvement of other young players and getting rid of Gordon and Mullens. But I lean towards Big Al having as important a role in this team’s step forward as it seems.

Written by julienrodger

March 31, 2014 at 11:10 pm

Fivethirtyeight.com’s flaws so far

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The Fivethirtyeight.com site recently relaunched. With its connection to ESPN.com, it’s clear the site saw a chance to recreate Grantland’s success, with Nate Silver playing the Bill Simmons role as its creator and most read writer.

The site to me, has been a disappointment so far. Not to count it out. Like a basketball player or first time coach, it could very well break through its struggles and soon become great.

But so far there are problems, as have been noticed by others around the net. For an article priding itself on “Fox” like journalism using as much data as possible, the articles feel short with the evidence feeling awfully half baked. Sometimes relying on one or two research studies, which are never trustworthy on their own for sample size and possible confirmation bias by the researcher.

So what is going on here? I don’t doubt the work ethic or commitment to the site by Silver or its writers, many who have done greater work elsewhere.

On the surface, what it seems like to me is this. Fivethirtyeight.com looks like a site trying to be a “primer to understanding data” for those who are not used to it. In other words, instead of targeting at the heaviest of data and statistical nerds, they are targeting those who have a mild interest in statistics and showing them that it’s “fun and informative”.

The motive for this is clear. The number of people in the casually interested in data group far outweighs the already statistical nerds. By targeting the former they can reach a larger audience and become a more successful site.

But this is a delicate balance. By making an article more simplistic and mainstream-audience friendly, the writers may be leaving out crucial information to their subjects and not writing the best article they can. In other words, 538’s articles become poor man’s versions of what could’ve been great articles. They just feel incomplete.

Ultimately this will be a hard problem for Fivethirtyeight to fix, but many talented people and thinkers are involved in the site including Silver himself, so they have a chance. The site’s goals may not be the same as Grantland’s. Grantland has a commitment to well presented, through articles, that both challenge the reader but speak in a genuine, sincere tone. So far Fivethirtyeight isn’t even a shadow of Grantland’s quality.

Written by julienrodger

March 27, 2014 at 11:55 pm

Posted in Uncategorized

Should Luke Babbitt scare teams about Doug McDermott?

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Creighton’s Doug McDermott is the likely player of the year winner in college, however despite his all-time great NCAA career, there are skeptics about whether he’ll make it in the NBA. Some see a starter, some see washout to a European league as his outcome.

One thing that’s scaring people, is McDermott’s similarities with Luke Babbitt. At about the same size and athleticism as McDermott, Babbitt’s perimeter shooting skills and high feel for the game were not enough to keep him in the league his first go around with Portland. He’s currently playing for the Pelicans after a stint overseas.

A first thing to consider is while Babbitt had a great shooting profile coming out of college, McDermott’s is a little better. While McDermott is no guarantee to be an even more deadly shooter than Babbitt in the NBA, at best he can be a Kyle Korver like savant hitting shots. At worst he could actually be worse than Babbitt at outside shooting.

Secondly, a crucial key with Babbitt is it’s not over for him. Babbitt has only played 1670 minutes in the NBA, 266 with the Pelicans. That would rank 5th in this year’s rookie class behind Victor Oladipo, Michael Carter-Williams, Trey Burke, Ben McLemore. He is still just 24. I tend to consider 6,000-8,000 minutes as a good benchmark for when a player starts entering “It’s time to start showing your talent” mode. Babbitt is not CLOSE to that point in minutes played. Inexperience made Babbitt a worse decision maker on offense and defense than he would be if a veteran with over 10,000 minutes played. Which pushed him from a player just good enough to contribute, to a player just bad enough to not contribute. Even if Babbitt got to 7,000 or 8,000 minutes and was struggling, it would be possible he’s an enigma not reaching his talent, due to mental flaws McDermott shouldn’t be expected to have.

Then consider how the Blazers were trying Babbitt as a small forward for the first 2 years of his career, accounting for about half his minutes so far. So his reps at power forward are especially small.

With that said, there is a reason why Babbitt played so little his first 3 seasons in Portland. When a player is struggling, how long a leash a player is given is likely connected to how much they believe in his upside, or the return on their investment. Nobody had any doubts that Babbitt had less than a star’s upside due to athletic limitations. If the Blazers developed him for 6,000+ minutes plus, they may have only had a player worth 5 or 6 million a year – easily replaceable in free agency. This still has value as a young, average player can become a trade chip (see Houston drafting Chase Budinger in the 2nd round and eventually trading him for a top 20 pick), but not every team may take this asset based approach.

Thus that is a major concern with Doug McDermott’s career. If his shooting goes the right direction (elite instead of good/great) he has the talent to be a very good bench lower level starter or standout 6th man. If his shooting is a little worse than elite and inexperience causes mistakes when he’s younger, he may fall out of a rotation and struggle to work his way back in, stuck on his team that doesn’t see the point in giving years of minutes to a player just to see him turn into a 6th or 7th man.. Most seem to feel McDermott has a limited upside. And although this fact tends to missed, as is the case with virtually all players who have a limited upside, that goes hand in hand with having a high bust potential as well for the team who takes him. Even if 27 year old McDermott is a good contributor, if he’s on his 3rd team by then, it didn’t work out for the team who took him. That would be partly on them for misevaluating his talent, but nevertheless. If McDermott has an OK upside and a high risk factor, it’s hard to justify taking him in the lottery.

Written by julienrodger

March 27, 2014 at 1:56 am

Analyzing some undrafted prospects who’s talent I rated highly

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Nearing 2 years since I developed my talent grading system, it is still early to compare the results to how the NBA drafted and whether I reached my goal out of outdoing them. But it’s not too early to look hard at some over or underperforming prospects.

As I have mentioned on a few occasions, I consider 2012 to be a trial year. Between then and the 2013 draft I polished up my grading methods and categories a lot. I haven’t given up hope that my order will outperform the real 2012 draft’s order, but it won’t blow the real way the NBA picked the players out of the water, I feel I can say now. I am more confident about my 2013 big board, albeit I also corrected a few things since then, making 2014 likely even better.

If one wanted to criticize my draft rankings so far, they may start with 3 undrafted seniors I posted in my top 10 talents – PG Scott Machado in 2012 (#4) and PFs Kenny Kadji (#3) and PF Jackie Carmichael (#10) in 2013.

One would think these 3 prospects would be a good test case for my system. If they went on to be NBA starters, it would go a long way to proving I am correct.

None of the 3 have performed as well as I hoped. In the D League they are treading water.  Machado since his trade to Idaho is averaging 9.9  points, 4.4 assists, 1.6 rebounds in 23.3 minutes per game (.56 TS), with similar stats in his previous D League stops. Kadji is averaging 6.2 points, 3.5 rebounds in 14.2 minutes per game (.48 TS). Carmichael is averaging 9.9 points, 6.6 rebounds, 1.5 blocks in 24.1 minutes per game (.52 TS).

Does this mean I was wrong to call them starting talents? Not necessarily. It’s conceivable starting talents could be performing no better than they have.

What makes the statistical dominance of some players in the D League fascinating, is it on paper should be a step up from the NCAA. Not only is the talent level higher, but more importantly, it’s a league made of physically mature men. Yet judging from the results of NBA caliber NCAA prospects who go to the D League within a year, it’s easier to statistically dominate the D League.

Of course, the reason for this is the D League is about individual statistics, not team wins. Therefore defense is typically ignored and sharing the ball on offense is a struggle.

So why aren’t Machado, Kadji, Carmichael taking advantage of these defense-less conditions?

First, note that a reason for NBA assignees dominating the D League, may be in part because they are NBA assignees. Not only due to huge minutes played (sometimes breaking 40 a game), but the team giving the ball to this “big fish in a small pond”. In a league about individual stat-padding, maybe what matters is who’s getting the ball the most with his teammates clearing out of the way for him. Machado, Kadji, Carmichael are more likely to get “lost in the shuffle” of shot attempts than NBA assignees.

Secondly, the real reason Machado, Kadji, Carmichael went undrafted, is how look it took them to emerge – all taking until their senior season to hit the NBA radar. If they had emerged as the great talents on their team in their freshmen, sophomore, or junior seasons, they’d have more likely built draft buzz. That these players blended in instead of individually showing out most of their college careers, may be connected to their average D League statistics. Some players may not be built to put up star statistics in the D League. To give you an example, Dominic McGuire is turning 29 this year and has played 342 Gs in the NBA, finding end of the bench roles as a defender and rebounder. Since going to the D League this year he’s averaged 13.4 points, 10.0 rebounds, 3.2 assists in 32.5 minutes per game. Per 36 minutes, this production is not really better than Machado, Kadji or Carmichael. Now mind you, McGuire wasn’t the type of player who’d meet my lottery rankings of those 3 prospects, but it shows not every NBA player automatically goes nuts in the D League. Thus an explanation could be these Machado, Kadji, Carmichael could be showing their NBA talent if they were in the NBA, such as 1st round picks – that the more system orientated, role player friendly systems, would work well for them. It’s possible that if Carmichael had been given the minutes and expectations Cody Zeller did as the 4th overall pick for the Bobcats, he may have played equally well or better. But if Zeller was in his place in the D League, he may have dominated it to 20/10+ rates. While it’s hard to say for sure, it’s possible Zeller could be more suited to dominate the D League but not any more suited to play well in the NBA.

Another explanation could be they are enigmas, in the D League or the NBA. My system rates talent but of course not every player is guaranteed to reach it. It may be players who get to be undrafted seniors, are the most at risk to not be reaching their talent. What makes this interesting is none of Machado, Kadji or Carmichael show the personalities of enigmas, in fact Machado and Carmichael seem particularly tough and driven to make it. But this may not be all that goes into an enigma. For example, even a tough and hard working prospect, could be sunk by confidence. It’s conceivable when they put a shot up, there’s a shadow of doubt throwing it off that NBA players just don’t have.

Finally another explanation for their struggles of course, could be that I was just wrong to be so high on their talent. If they continue to not make the NBA, I’ll do my best to see if there’s a way to improve the system to “catch” what went wrong with Machado, Kadji or Carmichael. As a recap, here’s a simplified version of what I see talent-wise in all 3 players:

PG Scott Machado

- NBA caliber physical tools: Average length, above average frame/strength, average to above average first step, below average lateral mobility.

Spot-up 3 pt shooter. Hitting 43%+ from 3 for Idaho, albeit struggled for Santa Cruz to start the year (but was coming off injury) and similarly inconsistent 3pt shooting year last season. Not as strong a midrange shooter or touch at the basket.

Great feel for the game/fluidity

Ideally in the NBA, Machado would be a “game manager” who could both hit spot up 3s and drive to the basket when given the opportunity, even if non-elite at both skills. Probably not much of a defender, but this is typically an afterthought at PG. A PG with decent physical tools with feel and 3pt shooting, should be NBA material.

PF Jackie Carmichael

NBA caliber physical tools. Average length, but great frame/strength. Can play above the rim a bit but overall an average athlete. Decent lateral mobility, was a great defender in college.

Has some skills. Great touch at the basket finishing and catching, can hit the 10-15 shot a bit, has some post skills and turnarounds. Struggled at the FT line in college, but hitting over 70% in the D League.

Above average feel for the game. Shows fluidity and craftiness.

Carmichael’s strength with reasonable athleticism/length, touch at the basket and from midrange and feel for the game, should make him an easy role player NBA talent. He’s been a great rebounder in both college and the D League, so that would also give him a role. A two way player like Taj Gibson may be someone for Carmichael to aim for if he made the NBA, or possibility even Carlos Boozer and David West.

PF Kenny Kadji

NBA caliber physical tools. Above average length, decent strength and athletic explosiveness. Decent lateral mobility.

3 point shooter in college. Takes 3s in the D League, but the % has been inconsistent. Some NCAA players need a year to translate to NBA range, mind you. Even 20 foot range would be rare for a PF/C. Enough of a ballhandler to drive to the basket off the dribble. Some post skill.

Above average fluidity and feel.

This is the guy I consider the no-brainer NBA starting talent of these 3. Not only are stretch bigs a commodity in the NBA, but most lack Kadji’s other gifts – the length, strength and athleticism to defend and the explosiveness/ballhandling to drive to the basket. This driving ability when added to his shooting, makes him even more of a mismatch. Kadji’s rebounding was a weakness in college, but has improved to 8.9 per 36 minutes in the D League, more in line with his physical tools.

I don’t consider the reason these guys are NBA talents to be complicated. All have NBA caliber physical tools, all have NBA caliber instincts/feel and from a skills perspective, all can do somewhere between a few things (in Machado and Carmichael’s case) and a lot (in Kadji’s case). Guys with NBA caliber physical tools with mental and skill talents should be able to cut it in the NBA. There’s no real reason to doubt them from a talent perspective really, just from a “Well they didn’t dominate in college until they had an age advantage and now they’re not in the D League, so they must not have it”. Which may be a valid concern after all. If these players don’t make it to the NBA, whether it’s because of lack of opportunity or because they are flawed prospects – it’d certainly make me more skeptical going forward of senior prospects who are barely on the NBA radar. To consider them dangers of not reaching their talent, whether it’s because they can’t or because the NBA won’t give them the chance. Either way I may place an asterisk next to these prospects saying I am unsure about their futures, as I am now about Machado, Kadji and Carmichael.

Written by julienrodger

March 21, 2014 at 3:49 am

Posted in Basketball, NBA Draft

2014 NBA Draft Talent rankings – March update

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Here’s my first talent big board for the 2014 draft. For a review of my talent grading methodology, click here. A few more notes:

- Since my system ranks talent, players are not guaranteed to reach their talent level. However, I consider the NBA exceptional at developing players to reach their talent level, with a limited number of enigmas in the NBA by my system. By the time a player reaches say, 6,000-8,000 regular season NBA minutes, they should be showing the signs of their talent level. I estimate about 5% of the 300 or so out of 450 players who have played long enough to no longer be called prospects, are enigmatic/not reaching their talent.

- Therefore if the NBA does not draft one of these players, or takes them in the 2nd round but doesn’t believe in them, I am more in the dark about whether they reach their talent level. Years down the road I may be able to speak with more confidence about the chance of an undrafted player breaking in the NBA and reaching their talent. For now there’s a possibility an undrafted player has a much higher chance of never reaching their talent than players who are drafted and developed by NBA teams. That and these players may going undrafted in the first place because they are enigmas – such as seniors who are not dominant statistically.

- As talent rankings, factors like health, effort level on/off the court, buyout concerns for international players, etc. are not taken into the account in these rankings.

I tried to include as many prospects in ESPN and Draftexpress.com’s 1st round mocks I felt comfortable ranking, as well as other prospects if relevant. I have 36 of those players rated on this list. Last year by June my list of rated players was over 60 players long. If I am unsure about a player’s position, whatever position I rate their talent higher in, is what I choose

To recap in my 3 categories for the players positions Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent, Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent, Feel for the Game talent, here are the grade meanings:

11: Transcendent, 10: Incredible 9: Elite, 8: Great, 7: Very good, 6: Decent, 5: Average, 4: Lacking, 3: Weak, 2: Very poor, 1: Awful

What the overall grades mean:

25+: Perennial all-star talent, 23-24: Blue Chip starter to Perennial all-star talent, 19-22: Blue Chip starter talent, 17-18: Rotation player to Blue Chip starter talent, 14-16: Rotation player talent, 12-13: Deep bench to rotation player talent, 11 or lower: Deep bench player talent

When players have the same total grade, I order them for now according to the combined physical motion/impact and feel for the game grade. If those are tied, I give the edge to the higher feel for the game. This is because I see feel for the game as most static, followed by the physical impact, followed by the skill impact.

The rankings:

1. C Joel Embiid

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade - 7 / Very good

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade – 7 / Very good

Feel for the Game talent grade – 9 / Elite

Total talent grade: 23 (Blue Chip starter to Perennial all-star talent)

No argument from me about the most talented prospect in the draft. In addition to the special fluidity and feel shows, when added to his lateral mobility and length, it makes his defensive potential aces. He shows signs of a post and perimeter shooting game. For a weakness he is not an explosive athlete. Embiid is a two way star at best and is the closest to a locked starter if he stays healthy. For the most part, there aren’t enough Cs in the league for Embiid to not start.

2. SG Nik Stauskas

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade – 6 / Decent

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade – 8 / Great

Feel for the Game talent grade – 8 / Great

Total talent grade: 22 (Blue Chip starter talent grade)

Perhaps the best offensive talent in the draft. In addition to his perimeter shooting skills (8 in the skill impact category could very well end up too conservative), Stauskas is such a good ball-handler for  a SG, it allows him to be a driving threat despite decent, not exemplary explosiveness. He also shows great fluidity and craftiness. Many are concerned about his defense and his lateral mobility indeed is unimpressive, but I see no reason why he can’t be an average defender, considering positional intelligence is as important as physical talent on that end. In the NBA plus defense is not a requirement to be a star player, if one provides enough offense.

3. PF Noah Vonleh

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade - 5 / Average

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade - 7 / Very good

Feel for the Game talent grade - 9 / Elite

Total talent grade: 21 (Blue Chip starter talent grade)

4. PF Julius Randle

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade - 6 / Decent

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade: 7 / Very good

Feel for the Game talent grade: 8 / Great

Total talent grade: 21 (Blue Chip starter talent grade)

5. SG Jordan Adams

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade - 6 / Decent

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade: 8 / Great

Feel for the Game talent grade: 7 / Very good

Total talent grade: 21 (Blue Chip starter talent grade)

Vonleh and Randle are the first two of a strong power forward class. Both with outstanding strength, Randle is the more athletic player, while Vonleh is longer. Both have a fluid feel and craftiness, Vonleh’s even better than Randle’s. The trick for both is adding the perimeter shot. They’ve both shown enough to me in both perimeter attempts and FT shooting, to make me believe they will be mid-range jumpshooters in the pros. When added to their strength, feel and touch at the rim, it should be enough to be starting 4s.

Adams is a very similar prospect to Stauskas. He can shoot, has an above average feel for the game and has the ballhandling and enough athleticism to drive. I see Stauskas as the better handler and more explosive off the dribble, but Adams to have better lateral mobility and strength.

6. PF Aaron Gordon

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade - 8 / Great

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade - 4 / Lacking

Feel for the Game talent grade – 8 / Great

Total talent grade: 20 (Blue Chip starter talent grade)

7. PG Marcus Smart

Physical impact (Athleticism, ballhandling, lateral quickness, size) talent grade – 7 / Very good

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade – 5 / Average

Feel for the Game talent grade – 8 / Great

Total talent grade: 20 (Blue Chip starter talent grade)

8. PG Jahii Carson

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade - 8 / Great

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade – 5 / Average

Feel for the Game talent grade - 7 / Very good

Total talent grade: 20 (Blue Chip starter talent grade)

9. SF K.J. McDaniels

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade- 5 / Average

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade - 6 / Decent

Feel for the Game talent grade – 9 / Elite

Total talent grade: 20 (Blue Chip starter talent grade)

10. SF Mario Hezonja

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade - 7 / Very good

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade - 6 / Decent

Feel for the Game talent grade - 7 / Very good

Total talent grade: 20 (Blue Chip starter talent grade)

11. PF Adreian Payne

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade - 6 / Decent

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade – 8 / Great

Feel for the Game talent grade – 6 / Decent

Total talent grade: 20 (Blue Chip starter talent grade)

12. PF Jabari Parker

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade - 3 / Weak

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade – 8 / Great

Feel for the Game talent grade – 9 / Elite

Total talent grade: 20 (Blue Chip starter talent grade)

13. SF Rodney Hood

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade - 3 / Weak

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade – 8 / Great

Feel for the Game talent grade – 9 / Elite

Total talent grade: 20 (Blue Chip starter talent grade)

14. SG Bogdan Bogdanovic

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade - 4 / Lacking

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade - 8 / Great

Feel for the Game talent grade – 8 / Great

Total talent grade: 20 (Blue Chip starter talent grade)

Gordon, Smart and Carson are intriguing talents. Gordon and Carson are two of the best athletes in the draft. Smart is not as athletic as them, but has great height and strength for his position. When added to above average feel/fluidity for all 3, the only difference between them and star talents is skill. Gordon is an all-around mess in that area, a grade of 4 admittedly is giving him the benefit of the doubt the can improve to OK. Smart and Carson are unreliable outside shooters. Still, they’re talented enough to be good players even with below average skill games – and great players if they make great leaps in the area.

Parker, Hood and Bogdanovic are somewhat on the opposite end. They have great perimeter skill and feel for the game, but do not show an explosive ability to attack the basket or physically impact the game, in addition to likely defensive concerns. Still, there is typically a place in starting lineups and the “blue chip” core for outside shooting and feel at a terrific level.

Hezonja and Payne somewhat bridge the above two gaps. They have athleticism and perimeter skill, but neither at an elite level. (Notably, including Hezonja here is almost pointless – by most accounts, there is almost no way he declares for this draft). McDaniels combination of feel, size and lateral mobility make him an excellent defensive prospect, while offensively he has 3 point range, even if not a slasher.

15. PG Jordan Clarkson

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade - 6 / Decent

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade – 5 / Average

Feel for the Game talent grade – 8 / Great

Total talent grade: 19 (Blue Chip starter talent grade)

16. SG Semaj Christon

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade – 7 / Very good

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade – 5 / Average

Feel for the Game talent grade – 7 / Very good

Total talent grade: 19 (Blue Chip starter talent grade)

17. PF Dario Saric

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade - 2 / Very poor

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade – 7 / Very good

Feel for the Game talent grade – 10 / Incredible

Total talent grade: 19 (Blue Chip starter talent grade)

Like Marcus Smart, Clarkson has an impressive combination of size and feel. While not a great athlete his ballhandling skills helps him drive. His 3 point shooting is unreliable, but the tools are there to be a rock solid, two way PG in a game manager role. Semaj Christon can slash and has feel, but on the wing to really break out needs better outside shooting. Saric is unique in he’s the only player I have a perfect 10 grade given to in this draft, with an amazing feel for the game. He is however unexplosive and undersized for his likely position at PF, with signs of a perimeter jumpshot, though not enough to bank on. His potential as a post up threat looks legitimate.

18. PF Clint Capela

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade - 8 / Great

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade – 4 / Lacking

Feel for the Game talent grade – 6 / Decent

Total talent grade: 18 (Rotation player to Blue Chip starter talent)

19. PG Dante Exum

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade – 6 / Decent

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade – 5 / Average (???)

Feel for the Game talent grade – 7 / Very good

Total talent grade: 18 (Rotation player to Blue Chip starter talent grade)

20. SF Andrew Wiggins

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade - 7 / Very good

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade – 5 / Average

Feel for the Game talent grade – 6 / Decent

Total talent grade: 18 (Rotation player to Blue Chip starter talent grade)

21. PG Deonte Burton

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade – 8 / Great

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade – 5 / Average

Feel for the Game talent grade – 5 / Average

Total talent grade: 18 (Rotation player to Blue Chip starter talent grade)

22. SF Kyle Anderson

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade - 3 / Weak

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade – 6 / Decent

Feel for the Game talent grade – 9 / Elite

Total talent grade: 18 (Rotation player to Blue Chip starter talent grade)

23. SG Gary Harris

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade - 4 / Lacking

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade - 7 / Very good

Feel for the Game talent grade - 7 / Very good

Total talent grade: 18 (Rotation player to Blue Chip starter talent grade)

24. SG P.J. Hairston

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade- 3 / Weak

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade – 8 / Great

Feel for the Game talent grade – 7 / Very good

Total talent grade: 18 (Rotation player to Blue Chip starter talent grade)

25. PF Doug McDermott

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade:  1 / Awful

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade: 9 / Elite

Feel for the Game talent grade: 8 / Great

Total talent grade: 18 (Rotation player to Blue chip starter talent grade)

This is where the depth of the 2014 draft starts to shine, as I still consider these prospects to still be pretty good, potential starters. Of the group Capela and Burton have my highest physical impact score, both imposing their explosiveness on the competition in a terrific way. Anderson leads the way in feel for the game, garnering the nickname “slo-mo” for his smooth, crafty style. Harris and Hairston have “3 and D” potential for their outside shooting, feel and enough size, but may not attack the basket in the NBA offensively. McDermott is an absolutely elite outside shooter for a PF (a case can be made for deserving of the second 10 in the class, after Saric’s feel for the game) with a great feel for the game, but provides nothing in the physical impact category. And in the group is Wiggins and Exum, currently mocked as top 5 picks. I’ve made my reservations about Wiggins known multiple times, such as in this post. As for Dante Exum, when looking at the only footage I trust of him in the Nike Hoop Summit game (because of its filming on TV cameras), I did not see as explosive an athlete as his reputation. He is also a hard player to peg in the skill impact category. The word seemingly, is outside shooting is a weakness more than a strength. Overall for these prospects, their strengths are either not big enough strengths, or their weaknesses are too big of ones, to rate higher.

26. PF T.J. Warren

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade: - 2 / Very poor

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade – 7 / Very good

Feel for the Game talent grade – 8 / Great

Total talent grade: 17 (Rotation player to Blue Chip starter talent grade)

The huge amount of 18 grade players, left only one in the 17 group. Warren will likely have to cut it as a stretch 4 in the NBA, where his outside shooting will likely be a strength instead of a weakness at SF. With his feel that may get him minutes, albeit physically he’ll be at a disadvantage, as neither explosive or big. His best chance to start is to become a great 3 point shooter.

27. SF Rondae Hollis-Jefferson

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade: 5 / Average

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade - 4 / Lacking

Feel for the Game talent grade - 7 / Very good

Total talent grade: 16 (Rotation player talent grade)

28. C Willie Cauley-Stein

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade: - 8 / Great

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade - 4 / Lacking

Feel for the Game talent grade - 4 / Lacking

Total talent grade: 16 (Rotation player talent grade)

29. SF Sam Dekker

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade – 3 / Weak

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade – 5 / Average

Feel for the Game talent grade – 8 / Great

Total talent grade: 16 (Rotation player talent grade)

30. SG Wayne Selden, Jr.

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade – 4 / Lacking

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade - 5 / Average

Feel for the Game talent grade – 7 / Very good

Total talent grade: 16 (Rotation player talent grade)

31. PG Tyler Ennis

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade - 2 / Very poor

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade – 5 / Average

Feel for the Game talent grade – 9 / Elite

Total talent grade: 16 (Rotation player talent grade)

32. SF James Young

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade – 5 / Average

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade – 5 / Average

Feel for the Game talent grade – 6 / Decent

Total talent grade: 16 (Rotation player talent grade)

33. SG Zach Lavine

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade - 2 / Very poor

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade - 6 / Decent

Feel for the Game talent grade – 8 / Great

Total talent grade: 16 (Rotation player talent grade)

These are players for whom where they get drafted and to who, likely will determine whether they can stick as energy guys, shooters or game managers off the bench. At absolute best case scenario, largely in the skill development department, they could make a run at starting.

34. C Jusef Nurkic

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade – 6 / Decent

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade - 6 / Decent

Feel for the Game talent grade – 3 / Weak

Total talent grade: 15 (Rotation player talent grade)

35. SF Jerami Grant

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade – 3 / Weak

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade – 4 / Lacking

Feel for the Game talent grade - 7 / Very good

Total talent grade: 14 (Rotation player talent grade)

36. PF Montrezl Harrell

Physical motion/impact (Explosiveness, ballhandling, size, lateral quickness) talent grade: – 6 / Decent

Skill impact (Shoot, post, pass) talent grade - 4 / Lacking

Feel for the Game talent grade – 4 / Lacking

Total talent grade: 14 (Rotation player talent grade)

These players look like 2nd round caliber prospects. Nurkic is the latest international C to have a flawed, stiff feel for the game, which it would be hard to get past with his average athleticism. Grant is not really gifted either driving to the basket or shooting. Harrell is an athlete without much size, skill or feel or his position.

Written by julienrodger

March 14, 2014 at 6:30 am

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